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TWIN PEAKS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE AUSTRALIAN ARCHITECTURE
1
I ABSTRACT
This article provides an analysis of the Australian ‘Twin
Peaks’ model of financial system regulation. It does so by
examining the theoretical underpinnings of Twin Peaks,
and investigates the crucial question of the jurisdictional
location of the prudential regulator. This includes a
description of how Twin Peaks functions and its strengths
and weaknesses. The article argues that while Twin Peaks
is the best solution to the problem of regulating for
financial system stability and consumer protection, it is
1 This research was undertaken in major part thanks to the generosity of financial
support from the Centre for International Finance and Regulation (CIFR) in Sydney,
Australia. That support, and support in numerous other forms from CIFR, is hereby
acknowledged with gratitude. Helpful comments and suggestions from Dr Michael
Taylor, the father of Twin Peaks, Professor Jeffrey Carmichael, Foundation Chair of
the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Professor David Llewellyn, Chair of
the Banking Stakeholder Group of the European Banking Authority, and Dr Patrick
McConnell are acknowledged with great appreciation, as is the guidance and
friendship of Mr Andrew Godwin.
2
nonetheless imperfect to the task, and susceptible to
failures.
IIINTRODUCTION
This article presents a theoretical analysis of the ‘Twin
Peaks ’ model of financial system regulation 2 , with
particular reference to the Australian version 3 and an
analysis of the crucial question of the jurisdictional
location of the prudential regulator.
The purported benefits of this research are two-fold:
first, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis
(hereinafter ‘ GFC ’ ), any model of financial system
regulation that has the potential to create a greater degree
of financial system stability is worth investigating. 4
Secondly, an understanding of the strengths and
2 Originally proposed by Taylor in Michael W. Taylor, “Twin Peaks”: A regulatory
structure for the new century, no. 20, Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation,
December, 1995.
3 For a discussion of the alternative models of financial system regulation, such as
the UK’s Financial Services Authority, see: Andrew D. Schmulow, “The four
methods of financial system regulation: An international comparative survey”,
Journal of Banking and Finance Law and Practice, Vol. 26, no. 3 (November,
2015).
4 For more on the benefits of financial system stability, see: David T. Llewellyn,
“Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation and Supervision: The Basic Issues”,
Paper presented at the World Bank seminar Aligning Supervisory Structures with
Country Needs, Washington, DC, series editor: The World Bank, 6th and 7th June
2006, p 5.
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weaknesses of the Twin Peaks model may be of benefit to
academics and policy-makers alike.
While Twin Peaks is imperfect to the task of
regulating to prevent financial crises or consumer abuse,
of the four models currently in use internationally, ‘Twin
Peaks’ is widely regarded5 as the best suited to this task.
This model has now been held up as the most
effective model to address the flaws in
unregulated or thinly regulated markets where
the most problematic issues arose in the GFC.6
The Australia version of Twin Peaks serves as the
touch-stone for this research, because Australia was first
to adopt Twin Peaks, has the longest experience in
operating this model, has recently subjected the model to a
rigorous independent review (the Financial System
Inquiry7), and in other countries where Twin Peaks has
5 See for example: John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, “Redesigning the SEC:
Does the Treasury have a better idea?”, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 95 (June, 2009),
p 774; Alex Holevas, “Twin Peaks: The envy of the world”, ‘News’, Wealth
Professional, 22 February, 2012. See also John Manley, “Dutch regulator says
“Twin Peaks” supervision best”, ‘Financial Regulatory Forum’, Reuters, US ed., 9
October, 2009. For IMF analysis of the model’s strengths see: International
Monetary Fund, Financial Sector Supervision: The Twin Peaks Model - Technical
Note, in ‘Financial Sector Assessment Program Update - Kingdom of The
Netherlands-Netherlands, IMF Country Report’, no. 11/208, International Monetary
Fund (IMF), June/July, 2011, p 12ff.
6 Financial Markets Authority (FMA), “Presentation by Sean Hughes to the New
Zealand Capital Markets Forum”, ‘News, Speeches’, 17 March, 2011.
7 Financial System Inquiry, Financial System Inquiry Final Report, Commonwealth
Government of Australia, November, 2014.
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been adopted, it is the Australian model which has been
emulated. The latest example of the adoption of the
Australian model (save for the jurisdictional location of the
regulator), is the Republic of South Africa8.
As a regulatory structure, it is the envy of many
in other countries, and more recent regulatory
architecture reforms in other countries are often
based on what is described as the Australian
‘Twin Peaks’ approach … .9
Moreover, Australia, and in particular its regulatory
regime, fared better than most other countries during the
GFC.10 But how much of that success can be attributed to
8 Republic of South Africa National Treasury, A safer financial sector to serve South
Africa better, in ‘National Treasury Policy Document’, National Treasury, Republic
of South Africa, 23 February, 2011; Financial Regulatory Reform Steering
Committee, Implementing a twin peaks model of financial regulation in South Africa,
Financial Services Board, 1 February, 2013; Republic of South Africa National
Treasury, “Implementing Twin Peaks Regulation in South Africa”, Media Statement,
(1 February, 2013), (accessed: 19 December, 2014), published electronically; A. J.
Godwin & A.D. Schmulow, “The Financial Sector Regulation Bill In South Africa:
Lessons From Australia”, South African Law Journal (forthcoming, 2015);
Financial Sector Regulation Bill, 11 December, 2013, (Republic of South Africa).
9 Alex Erskine, Regulating the Australian Financial System, in ‘Funding Australia’s
Future’, Australian Centre for Financial Studies, July, 2014, p 43.
10 Jennifer G. Hill, Why Did Australia Fare So Well in the Global Financial Crisis?,
in ‘The Regulatory Aftermath of The Global Financial Crisis, in Sydney Law School
Research Paper’, no. 12/35, 20 May, 2012, p 16 ff.
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Twin Peaks11, and how much to a combination of good
luck and good fiscal policy, remains unclear.
A quick analysis of APRA’s media releases shows
that of the 160 press statements since the
beginning of 2008, only 16 relate to regulatory
censure, or in regulator-speak “ enforceable
undertakings12.
To underscore this point it is of note that the Netherlands
employed Twin Peaks prior to the GFC and, as this article
will discuss in greater detail below, the Netherlands fared
poorly.
Consequently a clear and balanced account of the
strengths and weaknesses inherent in Twin Peaks, it is
hoped, will facilitate debate on, and understanding of, the
capabilities of this model.
The article commences with a description of Twin
Peaks, followed by an examination of the deficiencies
thereof. A decision to adopt Twin Peaks requires a
decision as to whether or not to locate the prudential peak
within the Central Bank (NCB), and an analysis of this
aspect follows. Finally, the article presents concluding
observations.
11 Cf. Australian banks were poorly regulated: Pat McConnell, “Debunking the myth
of our ‘well-regulated’ banks”, ‘Business & Economy’, The Conversation, 13
September, 2012 6.38am AEST.
12 Ibid.
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III WHAT IS TWIN PEAKS?
(a) A definition
A Twin Peaks regulatory model comprises two peak
regulators: one, the objective of which is enforcement of
prudential regulation; and a second, the objective of which
is market conduct and consumer protection.13 In Australia
these are the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority
(APRA), and the Australian Securities and Investments
Commission (ASIC) respectively. The title is somewhat of a
misnomer, in that the National Central Bank (NCB), which
in Australia is the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), has
responsibilities as the Lender of Last Resort (LLR)14, and
overall responsibility for financial system stability. 15
Consequently it may be more correct to call the Australian
model a Triple Peak system.
13 Working Group on Financial Supervision, The Structure of Financial Supervision.
Approaches and Challenges in a Global Marketplace, in ‘Special Report’, Group of
Thirty, Consultative Group on International Economic and Monetary Affairs, Inc.,
2008, p 24. For a complete analysis of the four approaches to financial regulation,
see also: David T. Llewellyn, op cit; Andrew D. Schmulow, Journal of Banking and
Finance Law and Practice, op cit. For a more complete exposition of what is
involved with financial system regulation, and conduct of business and consumer
protection, see: David T. Llewellyn, op cit, p 6.
14 Glenn Stevens, “Liquidity and the Lender of Last Resort”, in Speeches, published
by Reserve Bank of Australia, 15 April 2008, accessed: 24 September, 2015.
15 Reserve Bank of Australia, “Role of the Reserve Bank in Maintaining Financial
Stability”, in Financial Stability, published by Reserve Bank of Australia, 2001-
2015, accessed: 24 September, 2015.
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It should be noted that the overall objective of
prudential regulation is to prevent fragility among
individual financial entities. Consequently it may be
argued that both the prudential regulator and the central
bank are concerned with financial system stability16; the
regulator at the micro-level, the central bank at the
macro-level. This has implications for the location of the
regulator — within the central bank or without — to which
this article will return.
(b) Adoption
Twin peaks was introduced in Australia in 1998 in
response to the recommendations of the Wallis Inquiry.17
The original proposal was not Australian, however. It was
first suggested by an Englishman, Michael Taylor, in 199518,
16 In Working Group on Financial Supervision, 2008, p 24, the concepts ‘prudential
regulator’ and ‘system-stability regulator’ is conflated to ‘safety and soundness
supervision’.
17 The Report recommended the establishment of a Corporations and Financial
Services Commission (CFSC), later ASIC, (Stan Wallis, Bill Beerworth, Professor
Jeffrey Carmichael, Professor Ian Harper & Linda Nicholls, Financial System
Inquiry, The Treasury, 31 March, 1997, p 235), and the creation of the Australian
Prudential Regulation Commission (APRC), later APRA (ibid, p 298).
18 Michael W. Taylor, December, 1995, and subsequently: Michael W. Taylor, Peak
Practice: How to reform the UK’s regulatory system, no. 23, Centre for the Study
of Financial Innovation, October, 1996; Michael W. Taylor, ‘Twin Peaks’
Revisited... a second chance for regulatory reform, no. 89, Centre for the Study of
Financial Innovation, September, 2009; Michael W. Taylor, “The Road from “Twin
Peaks” - and the Way Back”, Connecticut Insurance Law Journal, Vol. 16, no. 1
(2009-2010); Michael Taylor, “Welcome to Twin Peaks”, Central Banking Journal,
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principally as a reaction to the ‘blurring of the boundaries’
phenomenon19 in the financial services sector in the UK20.
Addressing the blurring of the functions between different
kinds of financial entities was the progenitor for Twin
Peaks. Since addressing that issue, however, its purposes
have evolved, with the prudential authority, at least,
Electronic Article (17 August, 2010); Michael W. Taylor, “Regulatory reform after
the financial crisis - Twin Peaks Revisited”, Oxford, UK, in ‘Law and Finance
Senior Practitioner Lectures’, Wednesday 16 February 2011; Michael Taylor,
“Regulatory reform after the financial crisis. Twin Peaks revisited”, Chap. 1, in
Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation: Theories and International
Experiences edited by Robin Hui Huang & Dirk Schoenmaker, in ‘Part I,
Fundamental theories’, series editor: Routledge Research in Finance and Banking
Law, 1st ed., 2014.
19 Henriëtte Prast & Iman van Lelyveld, New Architectures in the Regulation and
Supervision of Financial Markets and Institutions: The Netherlands, in ‘DNB
Working Paper’, no. 021/2004, De Nederlandsche Bank, 21 December, 2004, p
6/12ff/25; Eric J. Pan, “Structural Reform of Financial Regulation”, Transnational
Law & Contemporary Problems, Vol. 19, no. 3 (Winter, 2011), p 830; Clive Briaullt,
“The rationale for a single national financial services regulator”, Financial Services
Authority Occasional Paper, no. 2 (1999), p 6/12/13/26; Heidi Mandanis Schooner
& Michael Taylor, “United Kingdom and United States Reponses to the Regulatory
Challenges of Modern Financial Markets”, Texas International Law Journal, Vol.
38, no. 2 (Spring, 2003), p 320ff.
20 For more on this see: Michael W. Taylor, “Twin Peaks”: A regulatory structure
for the new century, December, 1995, p 1; Graeme Thompson, “Regulatory Policy
Issues in Australia”, Paper presented at the The Future of the Financial System,
Sydney, NSW, edited by Malcom Edey, series editor: Reserve Bank of Australia
Economic Group, in ‘RBA Annual Conference’, Vol. 1996, 8-9July 1996, p 5/46;
Richard K. Abrams & Michael W. Taylor, Issues in the Unification of Financial
Sector Supervision, in ‘IMF Working Paper’, no. WP/00/213, International
Monetary Fund, December, 2000, p 10/11/26; Michael Taylor, “Welcome to Twin
Peaks”, Central Banking Journal, op cit; Working Group on Financial Supervision,
2008, p 7/13/19.
9
having come to assume an overall safety and soundness
role21.
Since its introduction in Australia, the model has
been adopted in a number of other countries. These
include the Netherlands,22 New Zealand23 and the United
Kingdom24. South Africa25 is in the process of adopting this
21 Working Group on Financial Supervision, 2008, p 24.
22 A.D Schmulow, Approaches to Financial System Regulation: An International
Comparative Survey, in ‘The Centre For International Finance and Regulation
(CIFR) Research Working Paper Series’, no. 053/2015 / Project No. E018, The
Centre For International Finance and Regulation (CIFR), January, 2015, p 33ff;
Henriëtte Prast & Iman van Lelyveld, 21 December, 2004, p 2/14/15.
23 See the remarks of the Chief Executive of New Zealand’s Financial Markets
Authority: Sean Hughes, “Financial Markets Authority - a new era in regulation -
Webinar package”, series edited by New Zealand Law Society, in Continuing Legal
Education, published by New Zealand Law Society, 25 November, 2011, accessed:
23 November, 2015.
24 See Financial Conduct Authority, “About us”, series edited by Financial Conduct
Authority, published by Financial Conduct Authority, 2014, accessed: 25 September,
2014 and Prudential Regulation Authority, “About the Prudential Regulation
Authority”, series edited by Bank of England, in Prudential Regulation Authority,
published by Bank of England, 2014, accessed: 25 September, 2014.
25 National Treasury, Republic of South Africa, Financial Sector Regulation Bill,
Comments Received on the First Draft Bill Published by National Treasury for
Comments in December 2013 (Comment Period from 13 December 2013 - 07
March 2014), in ‘Documents for Public Comments - 2nd Draft Financial Sector
Regulation Bill’, Vol. 1, National Treasury, Republic of South Africa, December,
2014; A.J. Godwin & A.D Schmulow, The Financial Sector Regulation Bill In
South Africa: Lessons From Australia, in ‘The Centre For International Finance and
Regulation (CIFR) Research Working Paper Series’, no. 052/2015 / Project No.
E018, The Centre For International Finance and Regulation (CIFR), January, 2015.
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method of financial regulation. France 26 and Germany 27
use elements of it.
(c) How it functions
The essence of Twin Peaks is a regulatory model which
ascribes equal importance to, and equal but separate
jurisdictional authority over, two core functions: one,
prudential regulation and two, market conduct and
consumer protection.28 Crucially, the model eschews the
concept of a lead regulator29: each agency must single-
mindedly fulfil its own remit.30
This ideal - separate but equal regulators - each
with its own bailiwick, has much to commend it. After all,
it is easy enough to understand the importance of the first
peak — the prudential regulator - as a defence against
financial system instability leading to crises. In the
26 A.D Schmulow, Approaches to Financial System Regulation: An International
Comparative Survey, ibid no. 053/2015 / Project No. E018, p 10ff, C. Goodhart, P.
Hartmann, D.T. Llewellyn, L. Rojas-Suarez & S. Weisbrod, “The institutional
structure of financial regulation”, Chap. 8, in Financial Regulation: Why, How and
Where Now?, in ‘Business & Economics’, 2013, p 185ff.
27 A.D Schmulow, January, 2015, p 14ff. C. Goodhart, P. Hartmann, D.T. Llewellyn,
L. Rojas-Suarez & S. Weisbrod, op cit, p 185ff.
28 David T. Llewellyn, op cit, p 27.
29 For a description of a ‘Lead Regulator’ model, see: C. Goodhart, P. Hartmann,
D.T. Llewellyn, L. Rojas-Suarez & S. Weisbrod, op cit, p 164; Gregg D. Killoren,
“Comparative Analysis of Non-U.S. Bank Regulatory Reform and Banking
Structure”, Law & Business, edited by CCH Incorporated, in ‘Banking & Finance’,
2009, p 9.
30 Gregg D. Killoren, op cit, p 10, David T. Llewellyn, op cit, p 27.
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aftermath of the GFC, however, there is left little doubt
that for financial system stability the market conduct
objective is equally important; it was market misconduct
and consumer abuse that gave rise to the subprime
disaster, and then metastasized into a worldwide series of
financial crises.
…morphed the subprime crisis into a virulent
global financial crisis.31
And on the connection between the subprime crisis
and the GFC:
have identified many billions of dollars of
fraudulent loans originated by Countrywide[ 32 ]
that were sold fraudulently to Fannie and Freddie
through false representations and warranties. …
31 Frederic S. Mishkin, Over the Cliff: From the Subprime to the Global Financial
Crisis, in ‘NBER Working Paper Series’, no. 16609, National Bureau of Economic
Research, December, 2010, p 4; Steve Denning, “Lest We Forget: Why We Had A
Financial Crisis”, Forbes, (22 November, 2011), published electronically.
32 ‘In 2006 Countrywide financed 20% of all mortgages in the United States, at a
value of about 3.5% of United States GDP, a proportion greater than any other
single mortgage lender.’ Ray Martin, “Bank of America’s great mortgage give-
away”, series edited by CBS Money Watch, in CBS News, published by CBS
Interactive Inc.. 9 May, 2012, 10:32 am, accessed: 26 September, 2015. Bank of
America purchased the ailing sub-prime lender Countrywide in January 2008, for
US$ 2.5 billion, in a deal that subsequently incurred losses for Bank of America in
excess of US$ 50 billion. Rick Rothacker, “The deal that cost Bank of America $50
billion – and counting”, ‘News, Business, Banking’, The Charlotte Observer, 16
August, 2014. Bank of America covered those losses with a US$ 45 billion dollar,
taxpayer-funded, bail-out from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Pro
Publica, Bailout Recipients, in ‘Bailout Tracker, Tracking Every Dollar and Every
Recipient’, Pro Publica, 24 September, 2015.
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97% of the Countrywide loans reviewed by
Ambac … had false reps and warranties.
Countrywide also engaged in widespread
foreclosure fraud. … examined by a truly
independent body has found widespread fraud —
in loan origination, loan sales, appraisals, and
foreclosures. … one financially sophisticated
entity after another found widespread fraud by
Countrywide in the entire gamut of its
operations, the administration, the industry …
Countrywide made hundreds of thousands of
fraudulent loans … It fraudulently foreclosed on
large numbers of loans. It victimized hundreds of
thousands of people and hundreds of financial
institutions, causing hundreds of billions of
dollars of losses. It has defrauded more people,
at a greater cost, than any entity in history ...
The financial media treats Bank of America as if
it were a legitimate bank rather than a “vector”
spreading the mortgage fraud epidemic
throughout much of the Western world.33
33 L. Randall Wray, “Setting the Record Straight One More Time: BofA’s Rebecca
Mairone Fined $1Million; BofA Must Pay $1.3Billion”, New Economic
Perspectives, ( 2 August, 2014), (accessed: 26 June, 2015), published electronically.
See also: Edward Wyatt, “Promises Made, Then Broken, By Firms in S.E.C. Fraud
Cases”, ‘Business Day’, New York Times, New York ed. 8 November, 2011. For a
full list of firms fined for financial malpractice and fraud related to the GFC, see:
13
While the Australian model provides a high degree
of statutory independence for the system stability
regulator, 34 APRA, it is to a degree answerable to the
Treasurer, 35 and both APRA 36 and ASIC 37 to the Federal
Parliament by way of submission of Annual Reports. This
comports with what Taylor envisaged for the model with
either Ministerial or Parliamentary oversight.38
Where the first peak — APRA — is responsible for
the safety and soundness of banks, the second peak —
ASIC — is responsible for market conduct and consumer
protection. It was argued such a system would be more
likely to resolve fragmentation, provide clarity of ambit, be
more cost-effective due to rulebook simplification, and
improve accountability - more likely, but not assuredly -
as the recent failings of ASIC in Australia have
demonstrated. 39 If the consumer protection and market
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Enforcement Actions. Addressing
Misconduct That Led To or Arose From the Financial Crisis, U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, 26 May, 2015.
34 S 11, Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act (Cth), No. 50 of 1998,
(Australia).
35 S 12, ibid, p. 4/5.
36 S 59, ibid.
37 S 136, Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act (Cth), No. 51 of
2001, (Australia).
38 Michael W. Taylor, “Twin Peaks”: A regulatory structure for the new century,
December, 1995, p. 11.
39 Adele Ferguson, “Hearing into ASIC’s failure to investigate CBA’s Financial
Wisdom”, ‘Business Day’, The Sydney Morning Herald 3 June, 2014; Adele
Ferguson & Deb Masters, “Banking Bad”, in Four Corners, Audiovisual Material,
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conduct regulator do prove effective, then advantages
accrue to consumers for a ‘ “ one-stop shop ” ’ 40 for
complaints against a regulated firm.
In terms of inter-agency co-operation and co-
ordination, the Australian model addresses this through
various memoranda of understanding.41
Whereas the legislative framework for regulatory co-
ordination is high-level and outcomes-focused, it does not,
however, provide detailed provisions as to the nature of
co-ordination or how it should be achieved.42 Instead, s
10A of the APRA Act43 provides in general terms as follows:
(1) The Parliament intends that APRA should, in
performing and exercising its functions and
powers, have regard to the desirability of APRA
coordinating with other financial sector
supervisory agencies, and with other agencies
specified in regulations for the purposes of this
subsection. (2) This section does not override
any restrictions that would otherwise apply to
Documentary, 5 May, 2014; Jane Lee, Cameron Houston & Chris Vedelago, “CBA
customers lose homes amid huge fraud claim”, ‘Victoria’, The Age 29 May, 2014.
40 Michael W. Taylor, “Twin Peaks”: A regulatory structure for the new century,
December, 1995, p. 11.
41 Anonymous, Memorandum of Understanding, The Reserve Bank of Australia and
The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, 12 October, 1998.
42 A. J. Godwin & A.D. Schmulow, South African Law Journal, op cit., p 9 of the
article.
43 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act (Cth), No. 50 of 1998.
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APRA or confer any powers on APRA that it
would not otherwise have.
The RBA has asserted that cultivating a culture of
co-ordination, under which the main focus is on
regulatory performance, rather than regulatory structure,
is crucially important. The Assistant Governor (Financial)
of the RBA has attributed the efficacy of co-ordination
between the regulators in Australia to a culture -
‘where we regard cooperation with the other
agencies as an important part of our job, and
there is a strong expectation from the public and
the government that we will continue to do so…
Key aspects [of coordination] include an
effective flow of information across staff in the
market operations and macroeconomic
departments of a central bank and those working
in the areas of financial stability and bank
supervision. Regular meetings among these
groups to focus on risks and vulnerabilities and
to highlight warning signs can be very valuable.
A culture of coordination among these areas is
very important in a crisis because, in many
instances, a stress situation is first evident in
liquidity strains visible to the central bank, and
16
the first responses may be calls on central bank
liquidity.’44
The success Australia achieved in addressing the
challenges arising out of the Global Financial Crisis, and
the 2010 Sovereign Debt Crisis, has been attributed to this
flexible approach to inter-agency co-operation.45 Indeed,
in interviews conducted with the regulators in Australia it
was evident that over-prescription, or formalisation, would
have stifled this flexibility.46
44 Malcom Edey, “Macroprudential Supervision and the Role of Central Banks”,
Paper presented at the Regional Policy Forum on Financial Stability and
Macroprudential Supervision Hosted by the Financial Stability Institute and the
China Banking Regulatory Commission, Beijing, PRC, in ‘Speeches’, 28 September
2012.
45 There are other, credible arguments to be made that the supervisory regime in
Australia was incidental to Australia’s success during the GFC. Australian banks
were, on the whole, ‘vanilla’. That is to say they were not heavily exposed to
mortgage backed securities or collateralised debt obligations. One senior executive
at ANZ Bank claimed this was as much foresight as luck: they had identified
problems in trading markets and chose not to participate. Stephen Bell & Andrew
Hindmoor, Masters of the Universe, Slaves of the Market, in ‘Business &
Economics, Banks & Banking’, 2015, p 270-273. Australian banks also enjoyed a
strong deposit base, they were not reliant upon wholesale funding, had a strong
domestic lending portfolio, and were restricted in their own mortgage lending
activities. Julia Black, “Regulatory Styles and Supervisory Strategies”, Chap. 8, in
The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation, edited by Niamh Moloney, Eilís
Ferran & Jennifer Payne, August, 2015, p 47, fn 129.
46 A. J. Godwin & A.D. Schmulow, South African Law Journal, op cit., p 12 of the
article.
17
To facilitate this co-operation, Australia has
established the Council of Financial Regulators (CFR),47 the
purpose of which is to oversee inter-agency co-operation.
The CFR is the coordinating body for Australia’s
main financial regulatory agencies. Its
membership comprises APRA, ASIC, the RBA and
the Treasury. ... It is a non-statutory interagency
body, and has no regulatory functions separate
from those of its four members. … CFR meetings
are chaired by the Reserve Bank Governor, with
secretariat support provided by the RBA. They
are typically held four times per year but can
occur more frequently... As stated in the CFR
Charter, the meetings provide a forum for:
— identifying important issues and trends in
the financial system, including those that may
impinge upon overall financial stability;
— … appropriate coordination
arrangements for responding to actual or
potential instances of financial instability, and
helping to resolve any issues where members’
responsibilities overlap; …
47 The Council of Financial Regulators, “The Council of Financial Regulators”,
series edited by The Council of Financial Regulators, published by Reserve Bank of
Australia, 2001-2014, accessed: 14 July, 2014.
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Much of the input into CFR meetings is
undertaken by interagency working groups,
which has the additional benefit of promoting
productive working relationships and an
appreciation of cross-agency issues at the staff
level.
The CFR has worked well since its establishment
and, during the crisis in particular, it has proven
to be an effective means of coordinating
responses to potential threats to financial
stability…
According to the Reserve Bank of Australia, the
experience since its establishment, and especially during
the crisis, has highlighted the benefits of the existing non-
statutory basis of the CFR.’48 Furthermore, levels of co-
operation and co-ordination between the peaks and the
NCB have traditionally been strong49.
(d) Separate but equal
The separation of the consumer protection function from
the prudential regulation function is the cornerstone and,
48 Reserve Bank of Australia, Submission to the Financial System Inquiry, Reserve
Bank of Australia, March, 2014, p 66.
49 Ian Beckett, “Financial regulation in Australia since the GFC”, JASSA, The Finsia
Journal of Applied Finance, no. 3 (2012), p 20.
19
supposedly, one of the principal advantages of a Twin
Peaks system.50
In theory, protection of retail consumers would not
be subordinated in order not to leave banks distressed.51
Indeed, in theory, guarding consumers might in fact
positively affect the safety and soundness considerations
that underpin prudential regulation, by nipping in the bud
malpractices that, while initially only detrimental to
consumers, ultimately become systemic risks. 52 The
example of market misconduct giving rise to the GFC is, in
this regard, instructive:
Neither predatory lending nor the selling of
mortgages on false pretences caused the crisis.
But they surely made it worse, both by helping to
inflate the housing bubble and by creating a pool
of assets guaranteed to turn into toxic waste
once the bubble burst.53
50 Stan Wallis, Bill Beerworth, Professor Jeffrey Carmichael, Professor Ian Harper
& Linda Nicholls, 31 March, 1997, in ‘Overview, Introduction’, p 29ff; Michael W.
Taylor, “Twin Peaks”: A regulatory structure for the new century, December, 1995,
p 1; Michael W. Taylor, “Regulatory reform after the financial crisis - Twin Peaks
Revisited”, op cit, p 5ff; David T. Llewellyn, op cit, p 16/27.
51 David T. Llewellyn, op cit, p 28.
52 See further: ibid, § 2, p 10.
53 Paul Krugman, “Looters in Loafers”, ‘Opinion’, New York Times, New York ed.
19 April, 2010. See also: Debra Cassens Weiss, “SEC Accuses Goldman Sachs of
Selling Mortgage Investment Designed to Fail”, ABA Journal, Law News Now,
Securities Law, (9:58 am, 16 April, 2010), (accessed: 25 June, 2014), published
electronically. Goldman Sachs was fined US$ 3.15 billion by the Federal Housing
20
Whether in practice the objective of equality
between consumer protection and system stability is
achieved, is debatable. Because the consequences of a
failure by the prudential regulator — system instability —
are more serious than the failure of the market conduct
regulator — consumer abuse — some would argue that the
former will always take precedence. Historically there is
evidence of this not only in the United States,54 but in the
United Kingdom55 and Australia as well.56
Finance Agency for misstating the quality of investments sold to Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac. The 15th bank to settle such claims. Benjamin Snyder, “Goldman
Sachs in $3.15 billion settlement with federal regulators”, series edited by Fortune,
in Finance, published by Time, Inc., 22 August, 2014, 7:50 pm EDT, accessed: 26
September, 2015. At least one Goldman Sachs trader, Fabrice Tourre, has been held
financially liable – not imprisoned however - for creating financial products
specifically designed, to fail, which he then bet against. Aaron Smith & James
O’Toole, “‘Fabulous Fab’ held liable in Goldman fraud case”, series edited by
CNN Money, in News, published by Cable News Network, 1 August, 2013, 6:21 pm
ET, accessed: 26 September, 2015.
54 For the need to address past regulatory failures, see: Daniel K. Tarullo, “Good
Compliance, Not Mere Compliance”, Paper presented at the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York Conference, “Reforming Culture and Behavior in the Financial
Services Industry”, New York, NY, series editor: Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, 20 October 2014, p 9/10; Lawrence G. Baxter, “Capture Nuances in Financial
Regulation”, Wake Forest Law Review, Vol. 47, no. 3 (Fall, 2012), p 547.
55 For proposals to address this phenomenon, see: HM Treasury, Bank of England &
Financial Conduct Authority, How fair and effective are the fixed income, foreign
exchange and commodities markets? Consultation document, Bank of England,
October, 2014, p 4/21/22/48. The outcome of this review was not yet available at
time of writing.
56 See: IV WEAKNESSES AS COMPARED TO OTHER MODELS (c)
Australia’s Twin Peaks failures: ASIC and the financial advice scandals.
21
(e) Advantages
Operating optimally a Twin Peaks model will give equal
priority to safety and soundness considerations, through a
separate bank prudential regulator, as it will market
conduct and consumer protection, through a separate
consumer protection and market conduct regulator. In
theory then, Twin Peaks aims to safeguard consumers as
vigorously as it does the soundness of individual banks.
To this end there is evidence that Twin Peaks is
better suited to performing these functions than any of the
other systems of financial system regulation currently
employed elsewhere in the world.57 It is potentially more
cost effective58, and makes a more optimal use of specialist
staff59. As a model, it is also more likely to give expression
57 Erlend W. Nier, Jacek Osiński, Luis I. Jácome & Pamela Madrid, Institutional
Models for Macroprudential Policy, in ‘IMF Staff Discussion Note’, no. SDN/11/18,
International Monetary Fund, 1 November, 2011, p 15/16. See also: De
Nederlandsche Bank, “IMF publishes its report on financial sector and supervision
in the Netherlands”, in News, published by De Nederlandsche Bank, 22 June, 2011,
accessed: 9 January, 2015; Michael Taylor, “Regulatory reform after the financial
crisis. Twin Peaks revisited”, op cit; Dirk Schoenmaker & Jeroen Kremers,
“Financial stability and proper business conduct. Can supervisory structures help to
achieve these objectives?”, Chap. 2, ibid; Professor Jeffrey Carmichael,
“Implementing Twin Peaks. Lessons from Australia”, Chap. 5, ibid in ‘Part II,
International experiences’; Brooke Masters, “Focus on G20 vow to raise financial
standards”, ‘Front Page’, The Financial Times, Morning ed. 15 October, 2009 03:00
am; John Manley, op cit; Eric J. Pan, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems,
op cit, p 822, Michael W. Taylor, Peak Practice: How to reform the UK’s
regulatory system, October, 1996, p 7.
58 David T. Llewellyn, op cit, p 12/19.
59 Ibid, p 19.
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to the goal of regulatory competitive neutrality, through
the avoidance of the inconsistencies, contradictions and
opportunities for arbitrage that come from multiple
regulators60 - a condition which Taylor described as an
‘alphabet soup’ of regulators61, when it existed in the UK,
prior to the establishment of the mega-regulator, the
Financial Services Authority (FSA).
Twin peaks achieves all this through better
regulatory focus through clearer objectives 62 ,
independence between the two peaks63, one-stop shopping
for aggrieved consumers seeking relief64, an avoidance of
conflicts and inconsistencies in regulation as a result of
regulators too many, or internal failures, magnified by
having regulators too few (as with the FSA 65 ), greater
jurisdictional certainty through clearer mandates, an
60 Ibid, p 19.
61 Michael W. Taylor, “Twin Peaks”: A regulatory structure for the new century,
December, 1995, p 7.
62 David T. Llewellyn, op cit, p 12.
63 Jeremy Rudin, “Opening remarks to the Senate Standing Committee on Banking,
Trade and Commerce, by Superintendent Jeremy Rudin”, Ottawa, in ‘Speeches and
Presentations’, 5 November 2014.
64 Michael W. Taylor, “Twin Peaks”: A regulatory structure for the new century,
December, 1995, p 11.
65 For the findings of the Inquiry into the failures of the FSA after the GFC, see:
House of Lords, House of Commons, ‘An accident waiting to happen’: The failure
of HBOS, in ‘5: A failure of regulation’, Vol. I, Parliament of the United Kingdom,
5 April, 2013, §§ 83/84/85, p 28; Financial Services Authority, The failure of the
Royal Bank of Scotland, in ‘Financial Services Authority Board Report’, Financial
Services Authority, December, 2011, § 30, p 28.
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avoidance of issues falling between the gaps66 because of
too many regulators, potentially greater capacity for
foreseeing and avoiding crises thanks to a more coherent
and efficient regulatory architecture, an avoidance of turf-
wars67, greater certainty for the regulatees - a corollary to
increased opportunity for regulatory arbitrage - and closer
alignment with the Basel Core Principles and the G2068.
Finally, the successful performance of Twin Peaks during
the GFC in Australia69 warrants attention.
In times of distress, Twin Peaks can, in theory,
maintain overall safety and soundness of banks, including
in the face of one or more bank failures70, provided the
failed banks are not of systemic importance.71
However, Australia has witnessed regulatory failures
and instances of financial distress under its Twin Peaks
66 Professor Jeffrey Carmichael, “Australia’s Approach to Regulatory Reform”,
Chap. 3, Making the Structural Decision, in Aligning Financial Supervisory
Structures with Country Needs, edited by Jeffrey Carmichael, Alexander Fleming &
David T. Llewellyn, in ‘WBI Learning Resource Series’, series editor: World Bank
Institute, 2004, p 110.
67 Ibid, p 110.
68 Brooke Masters, op cit.
69 John F. Laker, “APRA: The Global Financial Crisis And Beyond”, Paper
presented at the The Australian British Chamber of Commerce, Melbourne, 26
November 2009, pp 1/5.
70 Financial System Inquiry, November, 2014, pp 12/24.
71 Jeremy Cooper, “The integration of financial regulatory authorities–the Australian
experience”, Paper presented at the Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (Securities and
Exchange Commission of Brazil), 30th Anniversary Conference ‘Assessing the
Present, Conceiving the Future’, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 4-5 September 2006, p 5.
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regime. The extent to which these failures reflect upon the
overall reliability of the Twin Peaks architecture is
discussed below, and include its potential to be
overwhelmed by the failure of a systemically important
bank precipitating financial contagion; the potential to be
blindsided by circumstances that pose an unforeseeable
threat72 to the safety and soundness goals of the prudential
regulator; and regulatory forbearance as with ASIC and the
financial advice scandals in Australia. Put differently, Twin
Peaks’ is not infallible.
IV WEAKNESSES AS COMPARED TO OTHER MODELS
While Twin Peaks is an exercise in regulatory design, it is
nonetheless a design for a purpose — keeping the financial
system safe and sound, and protecting consumers. Where
this regulatory design has no answer to particular types of
threats to its goals, those deserve to be investigated.
Similarly, a failure to combat foreseeable threats also
deserve investigation.
Consequently this article will analyse the
vulnerability of the model to bank runs; the limitations of
72 See for example: Abayomi A. Alawode & Mohammed Al Sadek, What is
Financial Stability?, in ‘Financial Stability Paper Series’, no. 1, Central Bank of
Bahrain, March, 2008, p 14.
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the model as noted by the HIH Royal Commission73; the
failures of the Australian Securities and Investments
Commission; and Twin Peaks’ failure in the Netherlands
during the GFC, as outlined above.
(a) Bank runs & contagion
Banks are unlike other entities in one crucial respect: a
failure in one bank can cause the failure of a different,
unrelated bank, even one that is profitable and solvent.
More than anything else, it is the systemic risk
phenomenon associated with banking and
financial institutions that makes them different
from gas stations and furniture stores. It is this
factor—more than any other— that constitutes
the fundamental rationale for the safety net
arrangements that have evolved in this and other
countries.74
This widely investigated phenomenon, ‘contagion’,
and efforts to prevent it occurring, or at least mitigate its
effects, are a core concern of the regulatory models, Twin
Peaks or otherwise.
Contagion is a term used to describe the
spillover [sic] … effects of shocks from one or
73 The HIH Royal Commission, Report of the HIH Royal Commission, The HIH
Royal Commission, 16 April, 2003.
74 E. Gerald Corrigan, “The Banking-Commerce Controversy Revisited”, Federal
Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly Review, Vol. 16, no. 1 (1991), p 3.
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more firms to others. It is widely considered to
be both more likely to occur in banking than in
other industries and to be more serious when it
does occur. Bank (depository institution)
contagion is of particular concern if adverse
shocks, such as the failure or near-failure of one
or more banks, are transmitted in domino
fashion not only to other banks and the banking
system as a whole, but beyond to the entire
financial system and the macro economy. The
risk of widespread failure contagion is often
referred to as systemic risk.75
Typically, contagion originates with a bank run; that
is to say, a situation in which a large number of bank
customers attempt to withdraw their funds at once, and
bank reserves are inadequate.76
Depositor panic in a failing bank can spread to
depositors of other institutions. The resulting large-scale
withdrawals from banks that are third parties to the
original, failing bank can cause rapid insolvency in even
75 George G. Kaufman, “Bank contagion: A review of the theory and evidence”,
Journal of Financial Services Research, Vol. 8, no. 2 (April, 1994), p 123.
76 For a detailed discussion of bank runs, see: Charles W. Calomiris & Gary Gorton,
The Origins of Banking Panics: Models, Facts, and Bank Regulation, paper
presented at the Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research, The Wharton
School, November 1990, p 222/223; Ted Temzelides, “Are Bank Runs
Contagious?”, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Review
(November/December, 1997), p 3/10ff.
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profitable, well-capitalised and solvent banks. The
cascading withdrawals-cum-insolvencies can become a
full-blown financial crisis.77
This susceptibility to contagion is an unavoidable
consequence of how banks make money: they engage in
maturity mismatching — that is to say, they borrow money
short-term from demand depositors and from other banks,
and lend it longer-term, to homebuyers and the like.
It is the fundamental mismatch between bank
demand-deposit liabilities … and the illiquid,
risky, and opaque loans collateralizing (sic) those
insured deposits that gives rise to the current …
problem.78
77 For more, see: Governor Daniel K. Tarullo, “Rethinking the Aims of Prudential
Regulation”, Paper presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Bank
Structure Conference, Chicago, Illinois, series editor: Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, in ‘Speeches’, 8 May 2014, p 8.
78 R. C. Merton & Z. Bodie, Deposit insurance reform: a functional approach,
paper presented at the Carnegie-Rochester Conference on Public Policy, Vol. 38,
1993, p 5. Maturity mismatching was a significant contributor to the collapse of the
Indonesian banking system during the Asian Crisis. P. Srinivas & D. Sitorus, “The
Role of State Owned Banks in Indonesia”, Paper presented at the
Brookings/IMF/World Bank conference on “The Role of State-Owned Financial
Institutions: Policy and Practice” being held during April 26-27, 2004, Washington,
DC, series editor: The World Bank, 2003, p 17; A. Crockett, “International Financial
Arrangements: Architecture and Plumbing”, Paper presented at the Third David
Finch Lecture, University of Melbourne, 12 November 1999.
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Secondly, banks engage in a transformative
function79: they transform opaque and illiquid assets into
transparent and liquid liabilities. The effect of which,
however, is that banks cannot liquidate assets fast enough
in the face of widespread demand-depositor withdrawals.
The ensuing fire sale of assets will invariably further
damage a bank’s balance sheet.80
Consequently, while the argument can be made, and
strongly, that Twin Peaks is the optimal model for financial
system regulation, it is not a model that guarantees
everlasting bank solvency, even with best-practice
regulations aimed at maintaining bank solvency, which in
turn are adequately enforced. Nor does it claim to be able
to prevent the collapse of individual banks, particularly in
light of the unique vagaries and phenomena that affect
them. Taylor acknowledges this 81 , as do the Australian
authorities (as the next section, dealing with HIH, will
demonstrate). While there are steps in place to manage the
exit of a bank from the financial system, through such
79 For more on the transformation function, see: Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H.
Dybvig, “Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity”, Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. 91, no. 3 (June, 1983), p 402.
80 For more on asset stripping by banks in times of distress, see: R. C. Merton & Z.
Bodie, op cit, p 14/15.
81 Michael W. Taylor, “Twin Peaks”: A regulatory structure for the new century,
December, 1995, p 10.
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methods as ‘living wills’82, Twin Peaks nonetheless does not
have an answer when the collapse of one bank leads to
widespread depositor panic and widespread financial firm
distress, and this is an inadequacy in the architecture itself.
While it is true that Twin Peaks is not alone in this
shortcoming, the fact that it is susceptible to being
overwhelmed by a crisis 83 should be recognised as a
limitation in its design.
The interconnectedness of financial institutions
can also result in the failure of one player
quickly affecting others. This applies particularly
in the banking sector, and can occur either
because other institutions are directly or
indirectly exposed to a failed bank or because of
a loss of confidence amongst banks in each
other’s ability to meet future obligations when
they fall due, thus triggering a liquidity freeze as
evidenced at the start of the GFC. Moreover, the
public may lose trust in the banking system and a
bank run may ensue. Although the Reserve Bank’
s role of lender of last resort means that it has an
effective response to any bank runs, these
82 Elizabeth Fry, “Too big to bail: Aussie banks need a living will”, ‘Banking’, Asia-
Pacific Banking & Finance Monday 4 May, 2015.
83 Twin Peaks is a micro-prudential regulator. For more on a macro-prudential
regulator, see A current proposal in Australia, aimed at addressing past failures on
page 37ff.
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situations can easily spill over to the real
economy; for example, in the form of a credit
crunch. A key objective of prudential regulation
and supervision is to reduce these risks.84
Supporters of Twin Peaks counter that this
shortcoming - depositor panic precipitating contagion,
which then leads to a financial crisis — is one faced by all
systems of financial regulation, and this is true. Supporters
also counter that Twin Peaks is merely an architectural
design, not a panacea, and this too is true. But true as
those statements may be, they are little comfort to those
individuals who are disadvantaged or displaced by
financial crises. Moreover the architecture is an exercise
in the pursuit of an ultimate goal: financial system stability.
Consequently, and irrespective of whether Twin Peaks is
not alone in this failing, and irrespective of what the brief
to the original architects may have been, more recent
experience indicates that there is a possibility of a Twin
Peaks regime being overwhelmed by contagion, and this is
a flaw that must continue to receive close attention.
84 Toby Fiennes & Cavan O’Connor-Close, “The evolution of prudential supervision
in New Zealand”, Reserve Bank of New Zealand: Bulletin, Vol. 75, no. 1 (March,
2012), p 6.
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(b) Australia’s Twin Peaks failures: the collapse of HIH
When HIH insurance collapsed on the 15th of March 2001,
it was the second largest insurance company in Australia.
This made HIH’s collapse one of the biggest in Australian
corporate history,85 and heralded the adoption of a new,
risk-based approach to financial regulation, modelled on
that of the Canadian regulator, the Office of the
Superintendent of Financial Institutions. 86 HIH was a
regulated entity under the jurisdiction of the system
stability regulator APRA, at the time of its collapse.
After HIH ’ s collapse, the Royal Commission
constituted to investigate the incident found as follows:
The system gave APRA the ability to detect the
early warning signs that a company might fail.
APRA’s failure to pick up the many signs that
HIH was heading towards statutory and
commercial insolvency highlighted a number of
systemic weaknesses in its administration of the
regulatory system.87
APRA ’ s regulation of the HIH group was
inadequate … there was a systemic failure in
85 Rob Curtis, “Solvency as a Focal Point of Prudential Regulation: Supervisory
Lessons and Challenges”, Chap. 6, in The Future of Insurance Regulation and
Supervision: A Global Perspective, edited by Patrick M. Liedtke & Jan Monkiewicz,
2011, p 93.
86 Julia Black, op cit, p 262.
87 The HIH Royal Commission, 16 April, 2003, § 24.1.2.
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APRA to escalate the issues they identified to an
appropriate level. Throughout 2000 and 2001
APRA missed every opportunity to act upon the
warning signs that HIH was heading towards
statutory and commercial insolvency.88
Two implications emanate from this: the first is that
weaknesses in the enforcement of the model (as was the
case with the supervision of HIH) can bring the model
undone. Several issues arise as a result. One such issue is
that there are no guarantees that problems to do with how
well the regulator functions will be discovered through
reviews and inquiries. The possibility remains that
problems of enforcement, or lack thereof, will only be
discovered through failure or distress, as happened with
HIH. This presents the possibility that the system stability
regulator can be blind-sided by its own internal
management failings. Other obstacles to satisfactory and
consistent enforcement relate to the adequate resourcing
of the regulator89, the creation of the appropriate culture
within the regulator90, and the degree to which parliament
is captured by the financial industry.91
88 Ibid, § 24.1.13.
89 A. Campbell & R. Lastra, “Revisiting the Lender of Last Resort”, Banking and
Finance Law Review, Vol. 24, no. 3 (June, 2009).
90 APRA acknowledged that its ‘light-touch’ culture was responsible for its failures
with HIH. John Garnaut, “Watchdog licks its wounds after commission mauling”,
‘Business’, The Sydney Morning Herald 16 January, 2003. Failures in the UK
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The second implication from the HIH Royal
Commission finding is that in Australia - the leading
proponent of Twin Peaks - it is accepted that the model
will have to tolerate, from time to time at least, individual
bank failure. That position persists to this day.92
APRA does not pursue a zero failure objective.
APRA cannot eliminate completely the risk that a
regulated entity might fail and it recognises that
any attempt to do so would impose unnecessary
burden on regulated entities and harden the
arteries of the financial system. … Government’s
Statement of Expectations of APRA that
“...prudential regulation cannot and should not
seek to guarantee a zero failure rate of
prudentially regulated institutions or provide
during the GFC were similarly attributed to the inadequacies of the light touch. Jill
Treanor, “Farewell to the FSA – and the bleak legacy of the light-touch regulator”,
‘Business’, The Guardian/The Observer 24 March, 2013.
91 See: Stephen Long, “APRA: Government accused of politicising bank watchdog
over super fund briefing to crossbench senators”, in News, published by Australian
Broadcasting Corporation, 28 October 2015, 8:11pm, accessed: 22 November, 2015;
Stephen Long, “Why banks want a default superannuation free-for-all”, series
edited by The Drum, in Opinion, The Drum Home ed., published by Australian
Broadcasting Corporation, 28 October 2015, 12:03pm, accessed: 22 November,
2015. For the extent of this problem in the United States, see: Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr.,
“Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving In to Wall Street”, University
of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, no. 4/4 (2013).
92 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Supporting Materials for Assessment
Against the Basel Core Principles, in ‘IMF Financial Sector Assessment Program —
Australia’, Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, 2006, p 7.
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absolute protection for market participants
(including consumers).”93
In light of the interconnectedness of financial
entities, and in particular banks, the question arises
whether it is realistic to assume that the financial system
can indeed tolerate the failure of a single bank? Or
whether the failure of even a single, small bank could
endanger the financial system, and therefore necessitate
that a failing bank be rescued by the taxpayer? If, in reality,
a modern financial system is to be regarded as so
interconnected that it cannot, in fact, tolerate a bank
failure, then this presents a limitation of the capacity of
the Twin Peaks model (and every other model for that
matter): it cannot foresee all the circumstances in which a
bank may fail, yet it cannot tolerate such a failure.
… clearly demonstrate that small institutions can
pose their own challenges to stability…94
93 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Probability and Impact Rating
System, Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, June, 2012, p 7. See also: Julia
Black, “Managing Regulatory Risks and Defining the Parameters of Blame: A
Focus on the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority”, Law & Policy, Vol. 28,
no. 1 (January, 2006), p 8; Charles Littrell, “The APRA approach to insurance
supervision”, series edited by Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, in
Speeches, published by Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, 16 May, 2003,
accessed: 2 August, 2015, p 1; Financial System Inquiry, November, 2014, pp
4/11/24/36; The Treasury Australian Government, The Treasury Commonwealth





risk-based regulation may nonetheless be neither
as “rational” nor as consistent in substance as its
form suggests.95
… however, to the individual who has just
suffered financial loss because of the failure of a
small bank… unlikely to share APRA’s view that
APRA was perfectly justified ... Targeted
regulation is inevitably going to conflict with
public demands for universal protection.96
The collapse of HIH is therefore closely related to
the first flaw, that of bank contagion. But despite bank
contagion being a threat to the ultimate goal of Twin
Peaks — financial system stability — and one for which
Twin Peaks does not have an answer, even worse is that
the threat of an individual firm’s insolvency — as with HIH
— which could in turn precipitate contagion, can
potentially be missed by the regulator, despite the warning
signs.
94 Financial Stability Board, Increasing the Intensity and Effectiveness of SIFI
Supervision, in ‘Progress Report to the G20 Ministers and Governors’, Financial
Stability Board, 1 November, 2012, p 2.
95 Julia Black, “Managing Regulatory Risks and Defining the Parameters of Blame:
A Focus on the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority”, Law & Policy, op cit, p
23.
96 Ibid, p 24.
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(c) Australia’s Twin Peaks failures: ASIC and the financial
advice scandals97
The Australian regulatory model has not always fared well
in respect of combatting market misconduct, or the
protection of consumers, as the financial advice scandals
at the Commonwealth Bank (CBA) and Macquarie Bank
have demonstrated.98 ASIC’s inadequate performance and
undue delays in addressing these malpractices at CBA and
Macquarie were criticised by an inquiry led by the Upper
House of Australia’s Federal Parliament.99 Considering the
international fashionability of ‘ Twin Peaks ’ , and in
particular the influence of the Australian model, the
failures and shortcomings of ASIC — one half of the two
peaks — has been a significant and sobering outcome.
97 Elements of this section appeared in substantial part in a previous article,
published as a working paper by the Centre for International Finance and Regulation:
A.D Schmulow, January, 2015, p 46ff.
98 Adele Ferguson, op cit; Jane Lee, Cameron Houston & Chris Vedelago, op cit;
Adele Ferguson & Deb Masters, op cit; Adele Ferguson & Ben Butler,
“Commonwealth Bank facing royal commission call after Senate financial planning
inquiry”, ‘Banking and Finance’, The Sydney Morning Herald, Business Day ed. 26
June, 2014. For more on the cultural drivers underscoring changes in the ethics of
banking, see: Ross Buckley, “Australia’s banking culture: What has gone wrong?”,
‘Comment’, The Canberra Times, 16 June, 2015, 16 June, 2015.
99 Senator Mark Bishop (Chair), Senator David Bushby (Deputy Chair), Senator
Sam Dastyari, Senator Louise Pratt, Senator John Williams, Senator Nick Xenophon,
Senator David Fawcett & Senator Peter Whish-Wilson, Performance of the
Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Parliament of Australia, The
Senate, June, 2014.
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In respect of this failure some may argue that the
financial advice scandal has no bearing on Twin Peaks
which is, after all, an exercise in regulatory architecture. I
would argue that that assertion misses the point: the
design purports, in the case of the market conduct peak,
to be better equipped to protect consumers. Consequently,
if that peak has failed to take steps to protect consumers,
in what is a major national scandal requiring, as some
assert, a Royal Commission to investigate, then one must
question whether the architecture has failed to address
something key? After all, a regulatory failure such as this
one is not unforeseeable.
ASIC’s failures are all the more glaring, considering
the financial advice scandal affects thousands of
consumers. Despite this, and despite repeated tranches of
documentary evidence provided to ASIC by several
whistle-blowers, which included evidence of document
forgery and fraud, ASIC failed to investigate CBA for in
excess of 18 months, and was not remedied before a
significant amount of press exposure100, and scrutiny from
the Federal Senate101.
100 See for example: Adele Ferguson, op cit; Adele Ferguson & Deb Masters, op cit;
Adele Ferguson & Ben Butler, op cit; Jane Lee, Cameron Houston & Chris
Vedelago, op cit.
101 Senator Mark Bishop (Chair), Senator David Bushby (Deputy Chair), Senator
Sam Dastyari, Senator Louise Pratt, Senator John Williams, Senator Nick Xenophon,
Senator David Fawcett & Senator Peter Whish-Wilson, June, 2014.
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What the architecture needs to incorporate,
therefore, are methods either to incentivise the market
conduct regulator to act (by allowing, for example, ASIC to
keep a portion of whatever damages flow from successful
enforcement activities), or failing which, to compel the
market conduct regulator to investigate and prosecute
(through the establishment of a board of oversight, such as
that contemplated by the Financial System Inquiry102).
As Bhati points out 103 , consumer requirements of
trust are especially high in the provision of financial
services. Consequently it is argued that ASIC, by exercising
its powers to license 104 , set standards for 105 , and apply
enforcement regimes, both criminal106 and civil107 against
102 Financial System Inquiry, November, 2014, ‘Regulator Accountability,
Recommendation no. 27’, p 239. See further (e) A current proposal in Australia,
aimed at addressing past failures, p 29, below.
103 Shyam Bhati, “An Analysis of the Financial Services Regulations of Australia”,
International Review of Business Research Papers, Vol. 4, no. 2 (March, 2008), p
20.
104 Schedule 1 (Financial Services and Markets), Chapter 7 (Financial services and
markets), Part 7.6 (Licensing of providers of financial services), especially Division
2 (Requirement to be licensed or authorized), s 911A-D, Financial Services Reform
Act (Cth), No. 122 of 2001, (enacted: 27 September), (Australia).
105 Schedule 1 (Financial Services and Markets), Chapter 7 (Financial services and
markets), Part 7.6 (Licensing of providers of financial services), especially Division
3 (Obligations of financial services licensees), s 912A-F, ibid.
106 Schedule 1 (Financial Services and Markets), Chapter 7 (Financial services and
markets), Part 7.7 (Financial services disclosure), Division 7 (Enforcement),
Subdivision A (Offences), s 952A-M, ibid.
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financial service providers, consumers are encouraged to
assume regulated providers act appropriately. When a firm
acts improperly, and ASIC fails to act, then consumer
confidence in financial services is eroded108, which in turn
is inimical to the goal of creating thriving, healthy markets.
Furthermore, it is questionable whether the strategy
employed by ASIC, which relies heavily on self-
regulation 109 and industry codes of conduct 110 , is
appropriate or trustworthy; especially in light of recent
experiences with CBA and others.
(d) The Netherlands111
The Kingdom of the Netherlands was second to adopt a
‘ Twin Peaks ’ model in 2002 112 , retaining prudential
107 Schedule 1 (Financial Services and Markets), Chapter 7 (Financial services and
markets), Part 7.7 (Financial services disclosure), Division 7 (Enforcement),
Subdivision B (Civil liability), s 953A-C, ibid.
108 David T. Llewellyn, op cit, p 41.
109 See for example Schedule 1 (Financial Services and Markets), Chapter 7
(Financial services and markets), Part 7.7 (Financial services disclosure), Division 3
(Regulation of market licensees), Subdivision A (Licensee’s obligations), s 792A
(General obligations), (c), Financial Services Reform Act (Cth), No. 122 of 2001.
See also Standards Australia, “The Australian Standard on Compliance Programs”,
AS 3806-2006, published by Standards Australia, Sydney, NSW, 9 March, 2006.
110 Shyam Bhati, International Review of Business Research Papers, op cit, p 20.
111 Elements of this section appeared in a previous article, published as a working
paper by the Centre for International Finance and Regulation: A.D Schmulow,
January, 2015, p 33ff.
112 International Monetary Fund, Kingdom of the Netherlands-Netherlands:
Publication of Financial Sector Assessment Program Documentation—Technical
Note on Financial Sector Supervision: The Twin Peaks Model, in ‘Financial Sector
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supervision within De Nederlandsche Bank NV 113 ( ‘ The
Dutch Bank’ (DNB)). This is similar to the arrangement in
the UK, but distinct from Australia, where the prudential
regulator (APRA) is separate from the NCB.
The Dutch copied the Australian approach,
particularly as it applied to supervisory strategy - PAIRS
and SOARS - both of which the Dutch regulator, the DNB,
adopted.114
While the Netherlands managed to stave-off the
worst of the GFC, success for the Dutch authorities in an
economy with such an important financial sector was not
achieved without ‘drastic’115 government intervention. 116
Total foreign claims of Dutch banks amounted to
over 300% of GDP. The Dutch financial system
therefore depended heavily on external
developments. Only the Belgian and Irish
Assessment Program Update, IMF Country Report No. 11/208’, International
Monetary Fund, July, 2011, Table 1, p 6. See also: Henriëtte Prast & Iman van
Lelyveld, 21 December, 2004.
113 De Nederlandsche Bank, DNB Supervisory Strategy 2010 - 2014, in ‘Supra-
institutional perspective, strategy and culture’, De Nederlandsche Bank, April, 2010,
p 21; Eddy Wymeersch, “The Structure of Financial Supervision in Europe: About
Single Financial Supervisors, Twin Peaks and Multiple Financial Supervisors”,
European Business Organization Law Review (EBOR), Vol. 8, no. 2 (June, 2007), p
16.
114 Julia Black, “Regulatory Styles and Supervisory Strategies”, op cit, p 262.
115 De Nederlandsche Bank, Annual Report 2009, De Nederlandsche Bank NV, 24
March, 2010, p 37, and Chart, p 45.
116 See further: Julia Black, “Regulatory Styles and Supervisory Strategies”, op cit,
p 47, fn 128.
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banking sectors were in a similar position. The
European average was less than half the Dutch
figure at 135% of GDP. … exposure of Dutch
banks to the United States also was the highest in
Europe, at 66% of GDP. … whereas the average
of European banks had kept limited exposure of
less than 30% of GDP. By contrast, the exposure
of Dutch banks to hard-hit Eastern European
countries was at 11% of GDP just above the
European average of 8% of GDP.117
Intervention during the crisis took the form of
measures to stimulate employment through construction
and housing (€ 6 billion); capital injections for banks and
insurers (€ 20 billion); state guarantees for banks (€ 200
billion); a guarantee on all deposits up to €100,000118; the
nationalisation of the Fortis/ABN AMRO (€ 16.8 billion)
and ING banking groups (€ 10 billion), comprising 85 per
cent of the Dutch banking sector, 119 the SNS REAAL
117 Maarten Masselink & Paul van den Noord, “The Global Financial Crisis and its
effects on the Netherlands”, ECFIN (Economic analysis from the European
Commission’s Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs) Country
Focus, Vol. 6, no. 10 (4 December, 2009), p 3.
118 Ministry of Finance, Government of the Netherlands, “The Netherlands and the
credit crisis”, series edited by Ministry of General Affairs, in Financial Policy,
published by Ministry of General Affairs, undated, accessed: 11 January, 2015.
119 Martin Van Oyen, “Ringfencing Or Splitting Banks: A Case Study On The
Netherlands”, The Columbia Journal of European Law Online, Vol. 19, no. 1
(Summer 2012), p 6.
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insurance and banking group (€ 3.7 billion) 120 ; and a
reform of the financial system and the capital levels that
had been enforced to date. Thereafter the Dutch
government was compelled to drastically reduce spending
in order to reduce its deficit.121
In the aftermath of the crisis, the conclusions
reached about the performance of the Dutch regulators
were less than positive:
Both in the run-up to and during the credit crisis,
supervisory instruments fell short in several areas.
These deficiencies emerged in both the scope
and the substance of supervision. The trend
towards lighter supervision, reflecting
developments within the financial sector as well
as changed social attitudes, has gone too far.122
This finding supports the conclusions reached in the
analysis of the performance of the UK regulatory
authorities during the GFC, namely that regulatory
architecture alone is not a panacea against financial crisis.
Doubtless regulatory architecture is part of the solution,
but no more so than the capacity of the regulator to
120 Thomas Escritt & Anthony Deutsch, “Netherlands nationalizes SNS Reaal at cost
of $5 billion”, Reuters, US ed. Friday, 1 February, 2013, 6:30 am.
121 Ministry of Finance, Government of the Netherlands, op cit.
122 De Nederlandsche Bank, DNB Supervisory Strategy 2010 - 2014 and Themes
2010, De Nederlandsche Bank, April, 2010, p 5.
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foresee, at times, the unforeseeable, 123 and regulate
accordingly, and the willingness of the regulator to enforce
its regulations. So while the Dutch experience does not
support the argument that Twin Peaks is the optimal
model, nor does its failure in the Netherlands detract from
the argument that while Twin Peaks is not a complete
solution, for other reasons as outlined above, it is better
than the alternatives. Put differently, while Twin Peaks did
not save the Netherlands, had one of the other three
models of financial system regulation been used, under the
same circumstances, and with the same regulatory culture,
then in all likelihood the Dutch would have fared worse.
(e) A current proposal in Australia, aimed at addressing
past failures
In its Final Report, the Australian Financial System Inquiry
has recommended that in the future Australia establish a
123 See for example: Mary Douglas & Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture: An
Essay on the Selection of Technological and Environmental Dangers, revised ed.,
1983, p 1, where the authors state: ‘Can we know the risks we face, now or in the
future? No, we cannot; but yes, we must act as if we do.’ See also the response of
Lord Stevenson and Andy Hornby to the independent report into the FSA’s
enforcement failures surrounding the collapse of HBOS (Andrew Green QC, Report
into the FSA’s enforcement actions following the failure of HBOS, Prudential
Regulation Authority, Bank of England & Financial Conduct Authority, November,
2015), in which they defended their roles in, and inability to prevent the collapse of,
HBOS, as follows: ‘[the Report] downplays the unforeseen and unforeseeable effect
of the financial crisis on HBOS’. Jim Armitage & Nick Goodway, “HBOS collapse
back in spotlight”, ‘Business’, Independent Newspapers, 20 November, 2015 at
9:12pm.
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Financial Regulator Assessment Board (FRAB), the purpose
of which would be to provide advice annually to the
Government on how financial regulators had implemented
their mandates, and ‘ provide clearer guidance to
regulators in Statements of Expectation and increase the
use of performance indicators for regulator performance.’
124
In addition to evaluating the performance of the
regulators in respect of enforcement, the FRAB ’ s role
would be to act as a Devil ’ s Advocate, while testing
methodologies, questioning conclusions, and challenging
prevailing orthodoxies of thought and belief in its ongoing
assessment of the performance of the two peaks.
In behavioural economics, such “concurrence”
across a group is called groupthink. …
Groupthink … is unhealthy because, not only do
people start to think alike, it is only a short step
to believing people who are singing a different
tune should be excluded and thrown out of the
chorus. Dissent can be destructive, but the role
of the Devil’s Advocate is well-understood to be
124 Financial System Inquiry, November, 2014, Recommendation 27, ‘Regulator
accountability’, in Chapter 5, ‘Regulatory system’, p 239 ff. See also: Andrew
Schmulow, “Time for Abbott Government and ASIC to get serious about Australian
banksters”, ‘Business’, Independent Australia, 10 August, 2015; Pat McConnell,
“War on banking’s rotten culture must include regulators”, ‘Business & Economy’,
The Conversation, 4 June, 2015 2.14pm AEST.
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valuable, drawing out important questions
people would rather not answer. … [the FRAB
would comprise of] knowledgeable experts,
crucially not tied to regulators, with a diverse
membership that would “ act as a safeguard
against the FRAB being unduly influenced by the
views of one particular group or industry
sector”.125
Crucially, this proposal aims to introduce an arms
length between those conducting the assessment — the
FRAB - and those being assessed. Apart from insulating the
assessors - the FRAB - from a tendency towards the kinds
of concurrence 126 that exists within the regulators, such
distance will also, it is argued, be more likely to tease out
instances of where the regulators have, or may become,
suborned by the entities which they regulate, or by other
powerful vested industry interests. If nothing more, a FRAB
would constitute a double redundancy, a fail-safe, the aim
125 Pat McConnell, “War on banking’s rotten culture must include regulators”, op cit.
See further: Julie May, “Regulatory board to beef up watchdog accountability”,
‘News / Financial Planning’, Financial Observer, Daily News for Financial Services
Professionals, 10 December, 2014; Marion Williams, “APRA and ASIC need
cultural shift”, ‘Banking’, Asia-Pacific Banking and Finance, 9 March, 2015;
Andrew Schmulow, “To clean up the financial system we need to watch the
watchers”, ‘Business & Economy’, The Conversation, 4 March, 2015 2.11 pm
AEDT; Ruth Williams, “Merit in oversight board for ASIC, but only if it’s got
teeth”, ‘Business Day’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 28 January, 2015.
126 This comports with anecdotal observations made by the author at APRA during
the period October to December 2013.
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of which would be to pick-up the problems that the
regulators may have overlooked.
In addition, a FRAB could be expected to have a
positive impact upon the corporate culture of the two
peak regulators. Llewellyn points out that corporate
culture within a regulator determines the extent to which
it holds itself accountable, the way it exercises its
discretion (which in turn affects its efficacy and its
credibility, authority and public standing, and its ability to
be a role model to regulatees for their own standards of
corporate governance), the extent to which regulators
continue to earn the public’s trust and grow in esteem, the
ease by which the regulator can be captured or subjected
to undue political influence, the appropriate use of its own,
considerable resources, and its ability to acquire and
maintain international credibility.127
This proposal has precedent in the UK which has
established a Financial Policy Committee (FPC), the remit
of which is to look for the roots of the next crisis.128 Its
role is to identify, monitor and take action to remove or
reduce systemic risks. It has a secondary objective, which
is to support the economic policy of the Government.129
127 David T. Llewellyn, op cit, p 41.
128 Jill Treanor, op cit.
129 Financial Policy Committee, “Financial Policy Committee”, series edited by
Bank of England, in Financial Stability, published by Bank of England, 2014,
accessed: 26 September, 2014.
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While the FPC is not identical to the proposed FRAB — the
latter is intended to be a regulator ’s regulator and the
former a macro-prudential regulator — there are some
similarities, particularly as regards the FPC ’ s binding
authority over the system stability and market conduct
regulators in the UK130.
V VARIATIONS IN THE MODEL
It should be noted that Twin Peaks is a work in progress.
Among the countries that now use this model - Australia,
New Zealand, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom -
differences exist. One key difference between the
Australian model and those of the other countries listed is
to be found in the jurisdictional location of the system
stability regulator.
(a) Monopolistic versus Non-monopolistic Location of the
Bank Regulator131
While in Australia the prudential regulator is an entity
separate from the National Central Bank (NCB) — the
Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) - such non-monopolist
arrangements are not universal. That is to say, there are
130 Anonymous, “Definition of Financial Policy Committee FPC”, in The Financial
Times, published by The Financial Times Limited, accessed: 18 November, 2015.
131 The term ‘monopolist’ is a term of art defined by David T. Llewellyn, op cit at p
8ff.
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instances where the regulator is part of the NCB
(monopolist regimes), and others where the regulator is
separate (non-monopolist regimes).132
There is no definitive answer as to which regime is
preferable, but the available evidence favours a non-
monopolist approach. The advantages and disadvantages
of each are as follows:
(i) The monopolist approach
The monopolist approach has a number of advantages.
Chief among these are the synergies and efficiencies
enjoyed by locating the regulator within the NCB.133 The
converse of which, is that in a bifurcated system there will,
of necessity, be a degree of overlap between the
information gathering activities of the NCB and the
prudential regulator. 134 As the NCB will always collect
information about individual banks, purely by virtue of its
role in the conduct of monetary policy,135 an argument can
be made that the most efficient arrangement is to build on
this, and locate the prudential authority within the NCB.
Indeed some argue136 that when a financial system is
under strain, it is infeasible for the entity that regulates the
132 Ibid, p 28.
133 Ibid, p 30.
134 Ibid, p 30.
135 Ibid, p 30.
136 Ibid, p 30.
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entire system to be separate from the entity that regulates
each financial firm, and this has been the view of De
Nederlandsche Bank.
Further, in jurisdictions lacking a strong tradition of
independent regulatory agencies, advantages may be
gained by locating the regulator within an NCB, provided
the NCB has a strong tradition of independence137. The
Republic of South Africa serves as a good example. South
Africa is the most recent adopter of Twin Peaks, and the
South African Reserve Bank (SARB) will house the new
Prudential Authority (PA). The SARB ’ s independence is
enshrined in the South African Constitution.
‘The South African Reserve Bank, in pursuit of its
primary object, must perform its functions
independently and without fear, favour or
prejudice, but there must be regular consultation
between the Bank and the Cabinet member
responsible for national financial matters.’138
However, as Nevin asserts:
‘ So essentially, the SARB and the finance
ministry-controlled national treasury are the
137 See further: ibid, § 9, p 11.
138 Chapter 13, s 224(2), Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, No. 108 of
1996, (enacted: 1996), (Republic of South Africa). For an analysis of the degree of
independence enjoyed by the SARB see: D. Schmulow & L. Greyling, “Monetary
Policy in the New South Africa: Economic and Political Constraints”, South African
Journal of Economics, Vol. 64, no. 3 (September, 1996), p 176.
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monetary authority in South Africa, although the
Constitution expressly enshrines the SARB ’ s
independence … The apparent contradiction -
being independent on the one hand and having
joint authority over monetary matters with the
finance ministry on the other - tends to cause
confusion amongst South Africans and seemingly
friction between the SARB and the government.’
139
This position has precedent, because it is not
infrequently the case that the NCB enjoys a measure of
statutory, if not constitutional independence. 140 This
independence and reputational status are easier to extend
to a prudential authority located within the NCB, than
without. But, of course, the converse is also true: a failure
by the prudential authority located within an NCB will
damage the reputation of the NCB141. Moreover, the mere
presence of the prudential authority within the NCB will
contaminate the purity of the monetary stability objectives
139 Tom Nevin, “How independent is the South-African Reserve Bank?”, African
Business, no. 332 (June, 2007), p 32.
140 David T. Llewellyn, op cit, p 31.
141 See the remarks made by SARB Governor, Dr Chris Stals, quoted in C. Goodhart,
P. Hartmann, D.T. Llewellyn, L. Rojas-Suarez & S. Weisbrod, op cit, p 170/1. See
also Stals’ solution through enactment of separate legislation for the PA and the
SARB, ibid, p 171.
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of the NCB, by introducing bank safety and soundness
considerations.142
Conversely the NCB may be able to gain valuable
insights into the state of the economy by conducting the
activities of the Prudential Authority (PA).143 Heller144 and
Di Noia et al 145 state that an ability to influence bank
policy through regulatory pressure may add to the efficacy
of monetary policy. 146 They argue that due to the
interrelationship between the activities of the NCB and the
PA, co-ordination is a necessary prerequisite. 147
Management of the payments system to contain systemic
142 David T. Llewellyn, op cit, p 31.
143 Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio Di Giorgio, “Should banking supervision and
monetary policy tasks be given to different agencies?”, International Finance, Vol.
2, no. 3 (November, 1999), p 367. The authors cite a study into the US economy in
which confidential supervisory information on bank ratings allowed the Federal
Reserve to make more accurate predictions on macro-economic variables such as
rates of inflation and unemployment. Ibid, p 367.
144 H. Robert Heller, “Prudential supervision and monetary policy”, Chap. 11, in
International Financial Policy: Essays in Honour of Jacques J. Polak, September,
1991, p 272.
145 Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio Di Giorgio, International Finance, op cit, p 367.
146 See also: Vasso P. Ioannidou, “Monetary Policy And Bank Supervision”, Paper
presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Conference on Bank Structure
and Competition, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Conference on Bank Structure
and Competition Proceedings, Chicago, Il, series editor: Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago, in ‘Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Conference on Bank Structure and
Competition Proceedings’, May 2002, p 2.
147 Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio Di Giorgio, International Finance, op cit, p 367.
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risk may also require access, control and monitoring of the
participants in the system.148
Doubtless this assertion - the necessity of co-
ordination - is correct. However, it is not correct to argue
that co-ordination, of necessity, precludes two separate
entities, as analysis of the Australian model demonstrates149.
According to Haubrich, the information advantages
derived from a monopolistic approach are ‘particularly
needed in times of financial crisis, when only direct
supervision can deliver the essential information on time.’
150 Similarly, a central bank supervising the banking system
may be better placed to know whether a bank seeking
assistance from the NCB as lender of last resort is insolvent,
or simply illiquid.151 However, as Goodhart et al152 argue,
‘the revealed preference of monetary authorities has been
to rescue banks running into difficulties, so long as there
148 Ibid, p 368, citing Charles Goodhart & Dirk Schoenmaker, “Institutional
separation between supervisory and monetary agencies”, Giornale degli economisti
e annali di economia, Vol. 51, no. 9/12 (October-December, 1992), p 370.
149 For more on inter-agency co-ordination, see: A.D Schmulow, January, 2015, p
45 ff.
150 Joseph G. Haubrich, “Combining bank supervision and monetary policy”,
Economic Commentary (November, 1996), p 4.
151 Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio Di Giorgio, International Finance, op cit, p 368. See
also: Vasso P. Ioannidou, “Does monetary policy affect the central bank’s role in
bank supervision?”, Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 14, no. 1 (January,
2005), p 61.
152 Charles Goodhart & Dirk Schoenmaker, “Should the Functions of Monetary
Policy and Banking Supervision Be Separated?”, Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 47,
no. 4 (October, 1995), p 549.
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appeared to be any risk of a systemic knock-on effect’153
and that, consequently, the argument in favour of an NCB
being better placed to know whether a bank seeking credit
merits assistance, does not hold. Additionally Haubrich’s
argument does not of necessity exclude a non-monopolist
approach. Close co-ordination, as currently exists in
Australia 154 , between the NCB and the PA, with clearly
defined processes, may provide the necessary mechanisms
for systemic stability.155
153 Vasso P. Ioannidou, “Does monetary policy affect the central bank’s role in bank
supervision?”, Journal of Financial Intermediation, op cit, p 61.
154 Anonymous, Memorandum of Understanding, 12 October, 1998; The Council of
Financial Regulators, op cit: ‘In the CFR, members share information, discuss
regulatory issues and, if the need arises, coordinate responses to potential threats to
financial stability. The CFR also advises Government on the adequacy of Australia’s
financial regulatory arrangements’; and The Council of Financial Regulators,
Memorandum of Understanding on Financial Distress Management between the
Members of the Council of Financial Regulators, The Reserve Bank of Australia,
The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, The Australian Securities and
Investments Commission and The Treasury of the Commonwealth of Australia, 18
September, 2008.
155 Contra, see Vasso P. Ioannidou, “Does monetary policy affect the central bank’s
role in bank supervision?”, Journal of Financial Intermediation, op cit, p 61, fn 3:
‘This argument assumes that it is not possible for a third party, responsible for bank
supervision, to transfer information effectively to the [Lender of Last Resort]. This
assumption is clearly debatable. However, it seems more plausible during periods of
financial instability, since the speed and the degree with which the condition of an
institution deteriorates is significantly higher during periods of financial instability.
Moreover, it is in “bad” times that institutions are more likely to “cook” their books
and hide their true condition. Hence, under these circumstances direct supervision
could help deliver the essential information on time.’
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Moreover, a separation between the PA and the NCB
may serve to insulate the NCB from the reputational
harm 156 associated with the failure of a regulated
institution, as was the case with the collapse of the
Australian insurer, HIH.157
(ii) The non-monopolist approach
In selecting to separate the PA from the NCB, and thereby
adopt a non-monopolist approach, the Wallis
Commission158 set forth its main reasons as entailing the
avoidance of the inefficiencies that arise when combining
deposit taking, insurance and superannuation regulation,
carried out by a ‘central bank whose primary operational
relationships are with banks alone and whose operational
skills and culture have long been focused on banking’; and
further that that separation would clarify that there are no
guarantees of solvency for any financial institution, or its
promises; and that separation would enable both the RBA
(NCB) and the APRC (now APRA — the PA) to focus on
their primary objectives, while clarifying lines of
accountability159.
156 Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio Di Giorgio, International Finance, op cit, p 369.
157 See: The HIH Royal Commission, 16 April, 2003.
158 Stan Wallis, Bill Beerworth, Professor Jeffrey Carmichael, Professor Ian Harper
& Linda Nicholls, 31 March, 1997.
159 Ibid, p 21.
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We argue that conducting supervision through
two separate agencies (one for macro- [NCB] and
one for micro-prudential [PA] supervision) could
introduce the necessary checks and balances in
the supervisory process that could potentially
strengthen governance.160
While empirical evidence in support of a non-
monopolist approach remains scant, one survey 161 finds
that inflation is ‘considerably higher and more volatile’ in
countries where the PA is located within the NCB.162 In
addition, a non-monopolist regulatory approach can be
said to comport more closely with the Core Principles of
Basel III - in particular Principle 2 163 - and is often
synonymous with a more competitive financial system.164
160 Donato Masciandaro, Rosaria Vega Pansini & Marc Quintyn, The Economic
Crisis: Did Financial Supervision Matter?, in ‘IMF Working Paper’, no. WP/11/261,
International Monetary Fund, November, 2011, p 5. See also an earlier study:
Donato Masciandaro, Marc Quintyn & Michael Taylor, Financial Supervisory
Independence and Accountability – Exploring the Determinants, ibid no. WP/08/147,
June, 2008, p 23.
161 Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio Di Giorgio, International Finance, op cit.
162 Ibid, pp 361, 372. According to their research, anywhere from 50 per cent to 100
per cent higher. Ibid, p 370. See also David T. Llewellyn, op cit, p 29. Contra, see:
Vasso P. Ioannidou, “Monetary Policy And Bank Supervision”, op cit, p 1.
163 Principle 2 states ‘– Independence, accountability, resourcing and legal
protection for supervisors: The supervisor possesses operational independence,
transparent processes, sound governance, budgetary processes that do not undermine
autonomy and adequate resources, and is accountable for the discharge of its duties
and use of its resources. The legal framework for banking supervision includes legal
protection for the supervisor.’ (Emphasis added). Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, Bank for
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Di Noia et al 165 find evidence of this in higher
lending-borrowing spreads in countries with a PA
integrated into the NCB, as well as the other indicators of
bank profitability and efficiency, both of which are lower
in countries with an integrated, monopolist NCB-PA
structure. For example, staff costs are on average 50 per
cent higher, and bank reserves as much as 300 per cent
higher, in monopolist jurisdictions. Crucially, such a major
difference in reserves between monopolist and non-
monopolist countries is ascribed to the difference in the
way in which the compulsory reserve requirement is
employed between the two. In the former this requirement
is used both as a monetary policy tool and a form of
depositor protection. 166 Furthermore, countries with
monopolist regimes are typified by higher non-bank
deposits, and less intensive use of the interbank market.167
Banking sectors in ‘monopolist ’ countries are
more protected and somehow less developed and
efficient than those in ‘ non-monopolist ’
countries.168
International Settlements, September, 2012, § 41, p 10. See also David T. Llewellyn,
op cit, p 41.
164 Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio Di Giorgio, International Finance, op cit, p 373.
165 Ibid, p 373/4.
166 Ibid, p 375.
167 Ibid, p 376.
168 Ibid, p 376.
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There are, in addition, conflicts of interest 169 that
ought to be considered when locating the PA. The NCB’s
focus is primarily a macro-prudential one, whereas the PA’
s focus is chiefly micro-prudential. Consequently, as
lender of last resort, the NCB may find itself under
pressure to assist regulated institutions when the PA is
located within the NCB. It is argued that such conflicts of
interest are best avoided.
For example, a typical conflict that may arise is that
the NCB is concerned with the stability of the banking
system, primarily for the effect that that instability may
have on the payments system, its capacity to transmit
monetary policy signals, and the costs associated with its
lender of last resort function in a crisis.170 Conversely, the
PA’s primary concern is monetary stability, for the effect it
has on interest rates and possibly exchange rates171 and, in
turn, the effect those factors have on bank profitability
and, by implication, bank soundness.
Within this more usual context, the conflict of
interest may arise between the monetary
authorities, who wish for higher rates (e.g. to
maintain an exchange rate peg, to bear down on
inflation, or to reduce the pace of monetary
169 See also: ibid, p 368.
170 Ibid, p 367.
171 Ibid, p 367.
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growth), and the regulatory authorities who are
frightened about the adverse effects such higher
rates may have upon the bad debts, profitability,
capital adequacy and solvency of the banking
system.172
The corollary to this is when the monetary authority
displays a preference for lower interest rates: if, in such an
environment, bank profitability is typically low, or bank
balance sheet structures are vulnerable to lower interest
rates, then a further lowering of interest rates may
contribute to greater bank vulnerability, and may be
opposed by the PA. This potentially creates an
irreconcilable tension between the PA and the NCB.
Conversely, excessive focus on the PA’s concerns in the
setting of monetary policy may worsen bank fragility in the
long run.173
The sign on the estimated coefficient of
monetary policy indicates that when the Fed
tightens monetary policy, it becomes less strict
in bank supervision (i.e., an increase in interest
rates or a decrease in reserves is associated with
a lower probability of intervention). One possible
explanation is that the Fed tends to be less strict
172 Charles Goodhart & Dirk Schoenmaker, “Institutional separation between
supervisory and monetary agencies”, Giornale degli economisti e annali di
economia, op cit, p 361.
173 H. Robert Heller, op cit, p 273.
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on bank supervision in order to compensate
banks for the extra pressure it puts on them
when it tightens monetary policy. The Fed might
be interested in compensating troubled banks
either because it is concerned about possible
adverse effects from bank failures on its
reputation or because it is concerned about
possible knock-on effects. After all, the Fed is
responsible for maintaining the stability of the
financial system and it is responsible for the
supervision of some of the biggest banks in the
United States.174
A further instance for potential conflicts of interest
between the NCB and the PA include the expectation that
the NCB will be influenced by stability considerations,
when determining monetary policy,175 and those stability
considerations may override the enforcement
considerations of the PA. This is especially so in respect of
sanctions imposed by the PA, for malfeasance. If those
sanctions were to occur simultaneous with a crisis, the
NCB may be expected to persuade the PA to forebear.
174 Vasso P. Ioannidou, “Does monetary policy affect the central bank’s role in bank
supervision?”, Journal of Financial Intermediation, op cit, p 60.
175 Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio Di Giorgio, International Finance, op cit, p 369.
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Lastly, Di Noia et al176 assert that conflicts may arise
between macro (monetary) and micro (regulatory) policy,
in that monetary policy tends to be anti-cyclical, whereas
regulatory policy tends to be pro-cyclical.177 Di Noia et
al178 cite an example where, during an economic slowdown,
a bank’s non-performing loans may increase, precipitating
higher loan-loss provisioning rules, and pressure from the
regulator to increase the quality of the bank ’ s loan
portfolio, by ceasing to extend funds to higher risk
borrowers. As Tuya et al 179 point out, this leads to a
restriction in credit at precisely the time when monetary
policy should be expansionary.180
VI CONCLUSION
176 Ibid, p 369.
177 Charles Goodhart & Dirk Schoenmaker, “Institutional separation between
supervisory and monetary agencies”, Giornale degli economisti e annali di
economia, op cit, p 362.
178 Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio Di Giorgio, International Finance, op cit, p 369.
179 José Tuya & Lorena Zamalloa, “Issues on Placing Banking Supervision in the
Central Bank”, Chap. 26, in Frameworks for Monetary Stability: Policy Issues and
Country Experiences. Papers presented at the sixth seminar on central banking,
Washington, D.C., March 1-10, 1994, edited by Tomás J.T. Baliño & Carlo
Cottarelli, series editor: the International Monetary Fund, December, 1994, p 670.
180 For more on the correlation between an expansionary monetary policy and a
monopolist regulatory structure, see: David T. Llewellyn, op cit, p 29; H. Robert
Heller, op cit, p 272.
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The wisdom of the objectives-based architecture
[has] been borne out to a considerable extent by
the Australian experience. “This model avoids
the conflict of objectives faced by regulators
under virtually every other architecture. Where
an agency faces multiple objectives there is a
danger … that one will, for whatever reason,
dominate the other in terms of visibility with
senior management and/or allocation of
resources (as appears to have been the case with
Northern Rock in the UK).”181
The Twin Peaks regime has principally six
advantages. First, by assigning each regulatory agency a
single objective, there is maximum regulatory focus.
Second, there are significant potential synergies in
bringing together all regulators of a particular market.
APRA, for example, was able to bring together best
practices from banking and insurance regulation to create
a stronger framework for both. APRA was also one of the
first agencies to apply a broad risk-based supervisory
approach to all prudentially regulated sectors of the
financial system. Similarly, Australia was one of the first
181 Alex Erskine, July, 2014, p 43, citing Professor Jeffrey Carmichael, “Regulation
by Objective – The Australian Approach to Regulation: Statement to the US Senate
Committee on State Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs”, Washington,
DC, in ‘Statement to the US Senate Committee on State Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs’, 21 May 2009, p 6.
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countries in the world to introduce a single licensing
regime for market participants, by bringing all markets
under ASIC’s purview.
Third, bringing all prudentially regulated entities
under one roof is conducive to eliminating regulatory
arbitrage.182 Prior to the creation of APRA there were at
least three different types of institutions able to issue
demand deposits in Australia. These were regulated by
nine different agencies. Following its creation, APRA
introduced a fully harmonised regime for all deposit-
taking institutions. These are now regulated as “Authorised
Deposit-taking Institutions” (ADIs) under a single licensing
regime. This coherence over deposit taking was important
in retarding the growth of a significant shadow-banking
sector in Australia.
Fourth, bringing all prudentially regulated
institutions under one roof should facilitate a more
consistent and effective approach to regulating financial
conglomerates. APRA has been at the forefront of
international efforts to develop a framework for
consolidated supervision of conglomerates.
Fifth, allocating a single objective to each regulator
minimises the overlap between agencies and the inevitable
turf wars that accompany such overlaps. There are always
grey areas in practice, however neat the principles might
182 Cf David T. Llewellyn, op cit, p 22.
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appear in theory. The greatest potential overlaps are
between prudential regulation and systemic stability
regulation on the one hand (to the extent that prudential
soundness provides one of the key foundation stones for
systemic stability), and between prudential and conduct
regulation on the other (to the extent that they each
involve regulation of different aspects of the same
institutions). Notwithstanding the potential for overlap,
these have tended to diminish rather than amplify with
time and experience. In part this is a consequence of the
clear lines of responsibility in each situation. And, in part,
it is a consequence of the determination by the key parties
to co-operate in the interests of the system as a whole.
Sixth, the allocation of a single objective to each
agency should minimise cultural clashes. As a general rule,
conduct agencies are dominated by lawyers. Prudential
agencies, in contrast, are typically dominated by
accountants, economists, and finance experts. When these
two groups are combined in the same agency there can be
a clash of cultures as one seeks to dominate the other.183
A fairly typical phenomenon of financial regulation
is that in most countries the regulatory system was
designed in response to a financial system which, thanks
183 Professor Jeffrey Carmichael, “Regulation by Objective – The Australian
Approach to Regulation: Statement to the US Senate Committee on State Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs”, op cit, p 6/7.
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to innovation, no longer exists.184 Consequently, financial
innovation also requires regulatory system reform. On
balance, Twin Peaks is the regulatory paradigm most well-
suited to respond to these innovations. It is to be expected,
therefore, that an increasing number of countries will,
over time, adopt this system. Twin Peaks is not, however
an irrevocable guarantee of financial system stability.
New structures do not guarantee better
regulation. More appropriate structures may
help but, fundamentally, better regulation comes
from stronger laws, better-trained staff and
better enforcement. Any country that thinks that
tinkering with the structure of agencies will, by
itself, fix past shortcomings is doomed to relive
its past crises.185
… institutional structure does not in itself
guarantee effective regulation and supervision,
and it would be hazardous to assume that
changing the structure of regulatory institutions
is itself a panacea. What institutional structure
does is establish the framework in which to
optimise a regulatory regime. In effect,
184 David T. Llewellyn, op cit, p 9.
185 Professor Jeffrey Carmichael, “Australia’s Approach to Regulatory Reform”, op
cit, p 95/6.
65
institutional structure provides the architecture
of regulation and supervision.186
To this must be added a regulatory culture that
enshrines, as Das et al 187 assert, independence,
accountability, transparency, and integrity. If the
contention contained in this paper is correct, that
regulators, and particularly prudential regulators, are
required to foresee the unforeseeable, then in addition
there should be a culture that rewards regulators that
display those characteristics of independence,
accountability, transparency and integrity, while
inculcating a culture of curiosity and robust self-criticism.
With apologies to Sir Winston Churchill 188 , Twin
Peaks is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the
end. It is merely the end of the beginning.
186 David T. Llewellyn, op cit, p 42.
187 Udaibir C. Das & Marc Quintyn, Crisis Prevention and Crisis Management: The
Role of Regulatory Governance, in ‘IMF Working Paper’, no. WP/02/163,
International Monetary Fund, September, 2002, p 48.
188 Churchill’s address to The Lord Mayor’s Luncheon, Mansion House, 10
November, 1942. The original quote reads: “Now this is not the end. It is not even
the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning. Henceforth
Hitler’s Nazis will meet equally well armed, and perhaps better armed troops. Hence
forth they will have to face in many theatres of war that superiority in the air which
they have so often used without mercy against others, of which they boasted all
round the world, and which they intended to use as an instrument for convincing all
other peoples that all resistance to them was hopeless....”. The Churchill Society,
“The Lord Mayor’s Luncheon, Mansion House, “The End of the Beginning”,
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